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This paper examines the origins of language, as treated within Evolutionary Anthropology, under the light offered by a biolinguistic
approach. This perspective is presented first. Next we discuss how genetic, anatomical, and archaeological data, which are
traditionally taken as evidence for the presence of language, are circumstantial as such from this perspective. We conclude by
discussing ways in which to address these central issues, in an attempt to develop a collaborative approach to them.
1. Introduction
The emergence of human language is generally seen as one
of the major transitions in the evolution of the organic
world [1]: the defining characteristic of the human species
[2–4] or at any rate a crucial twist within it [5–7]. The
issue is not without controversy, as linguistic abilities have
been argued to be present in other species of hominids.
Relevant evidence ranges from genetic data [8, 9] to the
presence/absence of some sort of “symbolic culture” [10–
13]—and considerations concerning the anatomy of the
organs of speech and hearing abound as well [14–22]. Far
from attempting to settle the chronological issue, our goal
is to put forth some theoretical considerations that may be
useful in evaluating the existing evidence, suggesting new
avenues of research. Our perspective, often referred to as
biolinguistic, goes back to ideas by Eric Lenneberg, Noam
Chomsky, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, and others [23–27],
which extend from Linguistics to other areas of Cognitive
Science [28, for an overview].
In Section 2, we present the biolinguistic conception of
language. To avoid a dreadful terminological matter, we will
refrain from using the common term “language” and will use
instead the expression Faculty of Language when referring to
the object that may have evolved, in roughly the sense that
organs evolve within organisms. In Sections 2.1 through 2.3,
we review what is customarily taken to be evidence for the
presence of language, demonstrating how this is questionable
when interpreted from the perspective of a mental faculty.
We argue that the biolinguistic perspective, with its con-
ception of the Faculty of Language, may help Evolutionary
Anthropology in the quest for our origins—especially those
of our unique cognitive capacities. More specifically, in
Section 3 we offer an example of how the biolinguistic
perspective may contribute to progress in research, showing
how a shift in focus helps us make significant headway.
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2. Language: The Biolinguistics’ View
The Faculty of Language may be defined as a natural system
of computation that resides in the mind/brain of all members
of the human species. Our definition uses the term “human”
simply because (so far) no conclusive evidence exists of the
presence of the Faculty of Language in any other extant
or extinct species. As a result, the Faculty of Language (as
present in humans) provides the only frame of reference
for us to test scientific hypotheses concerning one putative
such faculty in Neanderthals, or any other species. Being
computational, this faculty must be studied as an information
processing system based on the application of certain symbol
manipulating capabilities [29, 30]. Being natural, it should be
understood as an organ that is part of a larger organ system—
the nervous system [31]. This faculty is also contingently
taken to interface other parts of the mind/brain, intuitively
related to “meaning” and “sound” (or “gesture”) [32].
To emphasize this point, we see as accidental properties
of the Faculty of Language the fact that, in humans, it inter-
faces other cognitive systems, in particular a Conceptual-
Intentional and a Vocal-Auditory component. This collec-
tion of systems (the Faculty of Language + Conceptual-
Intentional components + Vocal-Auditory components) is
often labeled as “the Faculty of Language in the broad
sense,” following Hauser et al.’s convention [33]. Factually,
how central the Conceptual-Intentional interface may be
to the human Faculty of Language is open to debate, but
the interface with the Vocal-Auditory system is certainly
contingent [34, 35]. As decades of research into human sign
languages demonstrate, these share the structural properties
of human vocal languages [36–38]. So the externalization of
“linguistic thought” does not privilege the Vocal-Auditory
system, and it can also interface Gestural-Visual components.
The fact that (some) Faculty of Language interfaces are
contingent is important. Our definition does not exclude the
(metaphysical) possibility of a Faculty of Language system
that shares definitional properties as outlined above but only
some of the contingent properties we normally associate to
the faculty in the human sense. Our conception allows, also,
for a natural computational systemwith powers analogous to
the linguistic ones to be studied here, but which is interfaced
with entirely different mental subsystems. In the hypotheti-
cal, the faculty in questionmight implement “functions” that
are entirely different from those traditionally attributed to
human language. Underlying these assumptions is Chom-
sky’s distinction between “competence” and “performance”
[32]: a system of knowledge (the Faculty of Language) versus
the (various) ways in which this system may be put to use.
Inasmuch as these properties of the Faculty of Language are
contingent, the natural system of computation itself should
be seen as functionally unspecific [31].
Those qualifications constrain the range of hypotheses
to test with respect to the origins of the Faculty of
Language. In particular, considerations about “systems of
communication”—or comparable such “functions” ascribed
to language in a vague sense—become orthogonal to the
faculty itself. Language as humans experience it serves
multiple purposes: to communicate thoughts, to be sure, but
also to assert the mere presence of an interlocutor, to lie, to
joke, to express beauty, to frighten into submission, to “talk
to oneself,” to call a distant star or a number that affects
no imaginable communicative act, to describe instances of
nondenumerable expressions in mathematics, and surely
many other purposes that any reader can fathom. Any of
those is a “function of language”, though none of them seems
more natural than the others. Importantly for our purposes,
the idea that language is “tailored to communication” (or
any of the other “functions” alluded to) has provided no
particular insight into the Faculty of Language as understood
by linguists of our persuasion.
The qualifications above also entail that language, when
rigorously understood, is far from a skill to be learned
by repetitive training, like skiing or scuba-diving. This is
particularly the case for “first languages,” as acquired by
children up to puberty. It is an open question whether
a “second language” acquired by an adult—often through
explicit teaching and rarely to native fluency—may indeed
be a skill, subject to variations in ease and rapidity of
acquisition, final performance, improvement, decay without
practice, and so forth. This unfortunately confounds the
matter of interest here. For it may well be that English,
definable in some abstract sense as a set of instructions one
could (ideally) get in training school for immigrants, has
relatively little to do with English in the mind of a native
English-speaking preschooler. For perspective, one can train
a human to hang glide, by taking advantages of the air
currents a condor uses. However, it would seem unjustified
to assimilate themental faculty behind the condor’s (natural)
flight to the skills necessary to succeed at human (artificial)
hang gliding (this is not to imply that learning a second
language does not employ the Faculty of Language in some
sense—after all, only humans learn second languages, even
if they do not do it to perfection. The point is raised
simply to emphasize the difference between an observable
behavior and its underlying causes). If we are interested in
the evolution of a natural entity like the Faculty of Language,
we cannot satisfy ourselves with vague considerations about
whatever mental capacity allows humans to learn languages
as adults—we have to go after the natural system in children.
That said, it is also important to distinguish the process
of acquiring English (any first language) from the innate
developmental process leading to the Faculty of Language
in an individual. To use another bird analogy, one thing is
for a zebra finch to acquire his (paternal) song (as opposed
to a different acquirable song by another conspecific) and a
very different thing is for that same zebra finch to develop the
mind/brain “circuitry” that makes the achievement possible.
Now just as the development of acquisition and performance
brain circuits is a well-understood prerequisite for successful
bird-song behavior [39], so too the development of the
Faculty of Language seems to be a precondition for the
acquisition of a given human language.
Having set aside contingent properties of the Faculty of
Language, it is worth emphasizing its intrinsic characteristic:
combinatory power. In short, the Faculty of Language, as
a natural computational system, appears to be roughly
equivalent to the family of systems traditionally classified
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as (mildly) context-sensitive in the Chomsky Hierarchy
of grammars [40–43]. In a nutshell, this means that the
system is capable of constructing complex expressions with
(i) a hierarchical structure and (ii) dependencies among
nodes in the hierarchy that are not expressible as hierarchical
nodes, thus requiring a more powerful computation (see
Section 3 on this). It is commonly held that no other natural
computational system has the same power of the Faculty
of Language [33]. Hauser et al. refer to this system as “the
Faculty of Language in the narrow sense,” meaning both that
it is the core component of the Faculty of Language in the
Broad Sense and that it seems to be an evolutionary novelty
[33, 44].
Given this set of assumptions, we would like to examine
next the evidence that is customarily adduced for the
presence of linguistic abilities in a given species. Our
interpretation of the data differs substantially from the
traditional one in Evolutionary Anthropology and suggests
a slight shift in focus. We will concentrate on the sorts
of evidence that are most often discussed in relation to
language origins: genetic, anatomical, and archeological
considerations, in that order.
2.1. Genes for Language?
Molecular biology currently benefits from methodological
tools capable of elucidating the differences, at the molecular
level, between human beings and other organisms. As a
consequence, it can also establish a precise chronological
dating of relevant evolutionary changes. Moreover, the pro-
gressive optimization of techniques devoted to the analysis
of the so-called fossil DNA has opened the way to the
possibility of directly measuring the molecular evolution
of such genes, yielding a much more accurate temporal
perspective of the nature, pace, and magnitude of changes
[45, 46]. This extraordinary methodological turn has made it
possible for the first fragments of nuclear genes from Homo
neanderthalensis to be cloned and sequenced [8, 47–49].
At this molecular level, FOXP2, generally regarded as
the “gene of language” [50–54], has been the focus of
much attention. This is the case due to two crucial facts:
(i) the occurrence of two nonsynonymous changes in the
sequence of the protein encoded by it [55], and (ii) the
almost certainty that the corresponding Neanderthal gene
also contains both substitutions. This suggests that the two
modifications in point were not selected in correspondence
with the emergence of Homo sapiens (around 200,000 years
before present [55]), but in fact much earlier: within a
common ancestor of our species and Homo neanderthalensis
(c. 500,000 years before present [8]). The latter scenario has
led different authors to speculate about the presence of a fully
human Faculty of Language—or rather “language” in some
general sense—in the second species [9, 56].
Interest in such comparative analyses has extended to
other genes whose mutations appear to cause specific lan-
guage impairments (these are conditions disjoint from neu-
rological dysfunctions, mental retardation, broad cognitive
deficits, a hearing impairment, or an inadequate exposition
to linguistic stimuli during development). For instance,
different substitutions in both DYX1C1 and ROBO1, two
genes associated to dyslexia [57–59], have been positively
selected in the human lineage: in the first case, after the
separation of the evolutionary lines leading, respectively, to
humans and the rest of higher primates [57] and, in the
second case, between 12 and 16 million years ago [58]. As a
complete genetic characterization of the Faculty of Language
cannot be made with the exclusion of genes that, when
mutated, impair other cognitive capacities besides language,
the catalogue of genes of interest is expected to increase in
the near future [60, 61].
All these findings point to new and exciting avenues of
research concerning the evolution of the Faculty of Language.
However, conclusions on this area are undermined by a very
common, but unfortunately untenable, assumption that the
existence of full-fledged linguistic abilities in other hominids
can be automatically inferred from the presence of the
human variant of any of these genes.
To begin with, even if many genes have presently been
cloned from people affected by specific language disorders
[60, 62, 63], paradoxical situations routinely arise. (i)
Sometimes relevant genes are also expressed in brain regions
not related to language processing, and even in tissues
outside the nervous system. (ii) Sometimes such genes are
mutated in people affected by other cognitive (i.e., non
specifically linguistic) disorders or are simultaneously linked
to diverse language impairments. (iii) In some individuals
affected by a particular language disorder, the sequence of
such “language genes” is normal (phenocopy), while (iv) the
linguistic competence of some of the individuals endowed
with an anomalous variant of one of these genes is not
impaired at all (null-penetrance) or is just mildly impaired
(reduced penetrance). Moreover, (v) the identity of such
genes differs (to a certain extent) from one population to
another or depending on the subtype of the disorder (for a
review of different cases, see [60, 63]).
A second point of concern is how genes actually con-
tribute to the regulation of the development and functioning
of the neural substrate of the Faculty of Language. Several
considerations are worth bearing in mind. (i) Genes do not
directly determine language; they just synthesize biochemical
products, which will be engaged in particular physiological
functions. (ii) Ordinarily, the same gene plays different
roles (i.e., contribute to different physiological functions)
in diverse moments and body tissues during ontogeny
(pleiotropy). Simultaneously, (iii) many genes usually con-
tribute (each to a different extent) to the same biological
process (polygenism). Finally, (iv) the extent to which a
particular gene product contributes to such a biological
process heavily depends on the precise balance it keeps, in a
particular moment and place, with the biochemical products
encoded by the remaining genes involved.
Other parameters besides genes themselves also con-
tribute to the initial “wiring” of the neural substrate of
the Faculty of Language. These include maternal factors (in
essence, protein gradients inherited via the egg cytoplasm)
and regulatory elements belonging to all levels of biological
complexity between genes (and their products) and brain
areas [64] (concretely, the metabolome, different subcellular
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organelles, the diverse brain cells, the synaptic activities, and
diverse specific brain circuits). Furthermore, information
relating to the structural features and functional properties of
the neural substrate of language could plausibly be generated
as a consequence of the developmental process itself [65, 66].
Plus they could depend on general laws that apparently
regulate the self-organization of biological systems [67, 68].
All these additional nongenetic factors, robustly appearing
and acting at certain developmental stages, can be plausibly
regarded as innate. Consequently, what can be deemed
“innate” clearly transcends what can be regarded as “genetic”
[69].
A third concern relates to the fact that complex regulatory
mechanisms probably determine just the basic intercon-
nection patterns among the diverse types of differentiated
neurons involved (and, thereafter, the basic histological
organization of the main anatomic macrostructures which
conform the neural substrate of language). In itself, however,
this need not produce fully operative computational devices,
understood in more or less customary cognitive terms [70].
Frankly, no one has a clear picture as to how such systems
may arise in nature in general, let alone minds/brains [71].
Another way of stating this important issue, emphasizing the
distance between what happens at measurable brain levels
and what is understood in more abstract mind terms, is
that any brain prewiring must be compulsorily implemented
by the feedback effect exerted by neural activity during
language processing. Only in such a way is the ultimate
cytoarchitecture of the neural substrate of the Faculty of
Language achieved, with fully operative neural structures
somehow resulting.
A fourth and crucial point to consider is that an increas-
ing body of evidence suggests that most of the molecular
changes occurred along our speciation have affected the tran-
scriptome rather than the genome (and, consequently, the
relevant protein sequences) [72–76]. These changes would
essentially have carried the following: (i) modifications in
the expression levels of different genes (and generally in the
corresponding protein stocks) [72] and (ii) modifications in
the spatiotemporal expression profiles of others, with the
subsequent creation of new combined expression patterns;
these are probably the basis for the appearance of new
structural and functional compartmentalisations at the brain
level and eventually of new cognitive capacities [77].
At the same time, both kinds of changes would have
fundamentally been the result of the modification of the fol-
lowing: (i) the cis regulatory regions of gene expression (i.e.,
noncoding regions located proximal to coding sequences on
the same DNA strand), as witnessed by the high number
of positive selection signals observed in noncoding regions
of genes associated with brain development and function
[78, 79], (ii) the levels and/or modulating properties of
certain transcription factors, components of signal trans-
duction pathways, and noncoding RNAs (ncRNAs) [80] and
(iii) the splicing patterns of mRNA of certain genes [81, 82],
which could have affected on average around 6 to 8 percent
of human exons, as compared with the chimpanzee [82].
Indeed, alternative splicing (i.e., the synthesis of different
functional RNAs from the same primary transcript) is
more frequent in the brain tissue than in any other [83].
Finally, it is also worth bearing in mind that other innate
information storage systems, including mitochondrial DNA
and epigenetic mechanisms, appear to exhibit a number of
significant differences between humans and higher primates
[84].
The case of FOXP2 leads to some particularly illustrative
conclusions. The introduction of the human variant in mice
produces interesting phenotypic alterations [85], while the
human protein brings about in vitro and in vivo a variation
in the transcriptional regulation pattern of the FOXP2 factor,
as compared to what happens in the chimpanzee [86].
Nevertheless, we mostly lack information about the sequence
(and evolutionary history) of the regulatory regions of the
gene. Very probably, significant mutations in these regions
have occurred throughout the evolution of our species, with
effects on the biological activity of the FOXP2 protein prob-
ably surpassing those caused by the mutations accumulated
in the coding sequence of the gene. Moreover, we also lack
enough information about the sequences targeted by the
gene [87] in other hominids (including Neanderthals) which
have also been subject to positive selection during our recent
evolutionary history. In other words, presently we are in
the dark even about the existence of alternative expression
patterns relatively to that of our species.
Advances in the molecular understanding of language
are certainly fast and promising—but still inconclusive and
relatively informative (connections between molecular and
linguistic data are generally indirect and rather unclear. E.g.,
the protocadherin 11 gene pair (PCDH11X/PCDH11Y) has
been suggested as a putative determinant of language via
its role in cerebral asymmetry [88]. Cerebral asymmetry
and right-handedness have recently been attributed to
Neanderthals and pointed out as an additional clue in
favor of the existence of complex linguistic capabilities in
this species [89]. However, the relation between cerebral
lateralization and language is not an implicational one [90–
92]. Furthermore, the relation between lateralization and the
peculiarities of the Faculty of Language qua computational
system is unclear, if it exists at all [93]). There is, however,
one thing we can be sure of: we cannot simply infer the
presence of the Faculty of Language from just the existence
of the human variant of a group of interesting genes, given
all other relevant uncertainties.
2.2. On Speech and Hearing. Since Lieberman and Crelin’s
analysis of the Neanderthal vocal tract [14], the debate on
the speech capabilities of extinct hominid species has thrived,
generally based on anatomical studies [15–19, 94]. This
line of research has recently been complemented through
the important finding, by the team working at Sierra de
Atapuerca, of the ear ossicles of aHomo heidelbergensis. These
have made possible to determine relevant features of this and
other species’ hearing capabilities [20–22]. In this section, we
would like to review these matters, although not attempting
to be exhaustive—for example, we set aside studies focusing
on anatomical features like the neural canal. Right from the
onset we want to say that, in our view, it is unfortunate that
this interesting debate should have been twisted into one
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on the presence of full-fledged linguistic abilities. Given our
discussion above, an inference from a modern speech and
hearing apparatus to the Faculty of Language, as presently
understood by linguists, is unwarranted. In what follows we
unpack our arguments as explicitly as this context permits.
First, it is a contingent fact that some humans exter-
nalize their “linguistic thoughts” through a Vocal-Auditory
interface; other humans achieve the same result through a
Gestural-Visual interface. Thus the presence of a modern
anatomy of the vocal tract and of the middle ear, per se, does
not sanction an inference of the presence of the Faculty of
Language (as they are soft organs, the outer and inner ear
do not fossilize, so we can only extrapolate their structure in
extinct species from comparative studies with other, closely
related, extant species. Needless to say, the inner ear plays a
determining role in the way the auditory signal is processed
[95, 96]). On similar logical grounds, absence of the modern
anatomy of the vocal tract would not allow us to infer absence
of the Faculty of Language. For perspective, we would not
conclude, if examining a human being who is incapable of
gestural-visual abilities, a corresponding absence of linguistic
abilities—on the basis of the fact that in other individuals the
relevant interface does exist. Patently, correlations of this sort
are weak. A being with a thoroughly modern Vocal-Auditory
interface but no Faculty of Language is as easy to imagine
as a being with archaic Vocal-Auditory interface but Faculty
of Language “plugged” into some different externalization
system (or none whatsoever). There is no a priori reason
to dismiss these reasonable theoretical possibilities (see [97–
99], for some evolutionary implications).
Secondly, one must carefully separate the perception
of sounds as such from the categorization of such stimuli
in linguistic terms. A given organism may be able to
produce/perceive sounds like, say, [u] or [i], without this
entailing that this sounds are interpreted as vowels by the
organism in point (these are the sounds that, for a human
subject, correspond to the vowels appearing in the English
words “booed” and “bead”, resp. Note that English [u]
and [i] are always long vowels and thus with a slightly
extended duration than the corresponding short vowels
found in other languages like Spanish. However the linguistic
quality of these sounds is the same in both languages),
without this entailing that these sounds are interpreted as
vowels by the organism in point. In essence, vowels are
linguistic units that, together with consonants, constitute
the building blocks of syllables. The latter, in turn, are the
basic constituents in the phonological structure of words
and phrases, the basis for their characteristic rhythmic
structure (rhythmical feet being still higher-order units) and
so on. Thus a linguistic symbol is not just a sound, but
an element in an intricate system of values that satisfy the
famous slogan (attributed both to Saussure and to Meillet)
that “chaque fait linguistique fait partie d’un ensemble ou`
tout se tient.” The distinction is not just pedantic. Human
babies in prelinguistic stages are able to perceive categorically
vocalic sounds like [u] or [i] [100], but so are other
mammals, primates included [101–105]. However, no one
should attribute the category “vowel” to these nonlinguistic
beings—unless one is ready to argue that, for these creatures
too, relevant such percepts arrange themselves into a system
of interrelated values.
From a biolinguistic perspective, the state of affairs
just described means that human languages have their
phonetic/phonological structure adjusted to production/
perception capabilities of the species. However, perceptual
capabilities as such are probably quite ancient. In all
likelihood, they are associated to the evolution of the
mammalian inner ear and its ability to perform the spectral
analysis of complex waveforms in order to individuate
their most intense harmonics. Moreover, the data on the
perceptual capabilities ofmammals are a clear indication that
a perfect adjustment between production and perception is
not something to be expected in all cases. It is observed in
chimpanzees, whose vocalizations appear to contain sounds
like human [a], [o], and [u], but nothing comparable to
[i] or [e], which, given the sensitivity of their middle ear,
are hard to discriminate for them [104]. That case contrasts
with that of chinchillas, who perceive but do not produce a
variety of the categories that enter the linguistic repertoire
in some form [106]. More to the point of our concerns
here, we simply do not know what may have happened in
earlier hominid species and whether they could or could
not discriminate sounds that they were not able to produce
accurately [22, 61].
Lieberman [107] argued that if we were to find any
evidence for the Faculty of Language in Neanderthals, and
they externalized Faculty-of-Language expressions through
the Vocal-Auditory interface, we would be able to predict that
their phonetic inventory was smaller than ours. Lieberman
furthermore suggested that this would be a phonetically
less efficient system than ours. However, in point of fact
anatomical evidence cannot tell us much about the Faculty
of Language. All it can tell us is that human hearing
capabilities antedate the apparition ofHomo sapiens, whereas
the modern configuration of the vocal tract seems to be a
novelty of this species (note, moreover, that some of the
features considered to be critical for the evolution of speech
are not as uniquely human as has often been assumed. Thus,
a descended larynx may be a human novelty as compared to
other primates—but it is also observed in other mammals
[108, 109]). Until we have additional, solid, evidence that
this change might have had something to do with the
emergence of a fully articulated language with a Faculty
of Language interfacing a Vocal-Auditory system, the rest
is sheer speculation (see [110, 111], for some interesting
proposals about how research in this area might proceed).
2.3. An Archeological Approach to Language. Archaeologists
studying the Paleolithic tend to agree that the transition
to the Upper Paleolithic is one of the most complex, often
elusive, research topics in this field [112]. Chronologically
located at c. 40,000 years before present, it is a process
that includes the demise of Neanderthals and not only the
appearance of anatomically modern humans in Europe but
their survival and their expansion into Eurasia—including
areas that had never been inhabited before by older hominid
species. Despite over forty years of studies and a few
unquestionable advances, a clear and precise idea of how
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this phenomenon took place still escapes us. Predictably,
language and other abilities considered modern are central to
the debate of the demise of Neanderthals and the endurance
of anatomically modern humans (who are assumed to have
had the same type of cognitive development level and
faculties as present-day humans [6]). Far too often, it has
been presupposed that these qualities are what ultimately
made the difference between the fates of the two species (see
[113], among others).
Until a decade ago, a hypothetical revolution that would
have taken place with the arrival of anatomically modern
humans in Europe was seen as the spark lighting the
intense changes the archaeological record of this period
reveals [114]. A thorough revision of the African record
[115] put an end to speculation, as it showed that every
single “revolutionary characteristic” had been independently
developed in that continent before being brought into
Europe as part of a new-to-the-area “toolkit”—for over
100,000 years. With that result in mind, any analysis that
attempts to shed light on the origins of language simply
cannot be done on European data alone but must be based
on much older remains, unearthed in African soil, where
relevant traits first appeared. A simple linguistic argument
for this view stems from the fact that the basic structure
of natural languages (e.g., in their logical form) is roughly
the same in all inhabited continents [116]. All existing
evidence points to the direction that an underlying Faculty of
Language, nomatter how abstract, emerged in a focal African
point and was subsequently carried to the confines of the
planet.
Needless to say, the origins of the Faculty of Language
cannot be directly studied by Archaeology as commonly
understood, because of the lack of fossil evidence in this
regard. At the same time, Archaeology aims at shedding
light on how ancient humans lived and how they adapted to
the environment and survived. Some of the ways in which
this must have happened seem so intrinsically connected
with the use of language that, no matter how invisible their
fossil remains may have been, they ought to be taken into
account when reconstructing the past. This is why a variety
of archaeological projects have focused on this topic. We will
concentrate now on the aforementioned set of innovations
that left marks or remains in the record: a collection of
traits also studied for other periods, involving economy,
subsistence, technology, and so forth.
A word of clarification is relevant at this point. One tra-
ditional aspect in which archaeology may relate to linguistics,
and vice versa, involves the sociocultural aspect of language,
especially as encoded in lexical structures. What linguists call
a lexicon—which can be defined as a repository of linguistic
idiosyncrasies atomized into words—is undeniable a cultural
artifact, aside from a fundamental cognitive component that
the Faculty of Language interfaces with. Plainly, the way
in which humans live affects how they record their living
history through their words. In the process skills, traditions,
instructions and other forms of “know how” repository may
have been coded. It takes little reflection to realize that such
explicit or implicit instructions would have such effects as
cutting production time for tools or allowing for elaborate
living dwellings, let alone artistic or metaphorical creations.
In this regard, more or less sudden innovation in any of the
latter—some of which do leave fossil records—can be seen as
an indirect argument for a lexicon. Inasmuch as the lexicon
presupposes a Faculty of Language, this then also constitutes
indirect evidence for such a mental organ (see [117], where
the argument is presented in a less meticulous fashion).
In the sections below we look into the traits that have
been identified as “modernity indicators,” all part of the
archeological record. We will examine their relation to
the Faculty of Language, as well as their implications for
anatomically modern humans, their expansion out of Africa,
and their survival.
2.3.1. Technology. Lithic industries constitute by far the
largest corpus of remains in the archaeological record of the
Paleolithic period. Accordingly, there is a large number of
remains that can be grouped under the label of “techno-
logical markers”. We will focus on three types that appeared
at different moments during the Middle Stone Age. Among
these are microliths (c. 70 ka), points (c. 250 ka), and blades
(c. 280 ka) [115].
Middle Stone Age lithic industries represent a radical
change from previous industries, both morphologically and
technologically: relevant assemblages include smaller tools
and new types, such as blades and microliths. Both were
thought to have been part of composite tools, formed by a
nonlithic section into which several lithic pieces would be
inserted. Points were vastly represented across the African
Continent during the Middle Stone Age; during that time
they constitute a clear case of regional artifact style, a
modernity indicator. These were also hafted to shafts, to be
used as projectiles [118].
Composite tools imply aspects that cannot be related
to older types of tools. These include forward planning
(standardized microliths as replacement of similar older
pieces broken during use) and the preparation and com-
plementation of different types of materials that had to be
worked in different ways and in separate stages, very likely
well before needed. These traits are typically attributed to a
stage of cognitive development that can perhaps be related to
the Faculty of Language.
Complex bone technology appears in the African record
at around 110 ka, during the Middle Stone Age. It contains
impressive pieces like the Katanda harpoons and points from
D. R. Congo [119]. These materials are dated well before the
appearance of the split base points that signal the presence
of the earliest Aurignacian in Western Europe. McBrearty
and Brooks [115] consider that the African bone-working
tradition has its origins much earlier in the Pleistocene.
The Middle Stone Age levels show that its development was
widespread in that continent.
Bone tools and artifacts manufactured using ivory, antler,
and shell supports (organic technology) are considered
modernity markers. Complex organic technology is one of
the innovations that signal the onset of the Upper Paleolithic
in Europe. It is at this point that we have the first evidence
that relevant materials are worked using techniques that are
different from those used to produce lithic tools. Previous
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attempts to use bone exist, but relevant artifacts are crudely
worked [120, 121]. Of course, the innovation highlighted
here relates not so much to the type of materials employed
but to the way in which the materials were worked to make
tools. Several techniques (polishing, sawing, and abrasion)
started at that time to manufacture organic tools. Split-base
bone points are an example of artifacts manufactured using
such methods.
The abovementioned types of tools have implications
within economic parameters. While some saw Middle Stone
Age populations as mostly scavengers [122], it is now clear
that they hunted. Moreover, their use of points indicates that
they had no need to get close to game, which boosted survival
rates at the same time that it improved productivity. Chase
identifies a specific type of hunting practice as exclusive to
anatomically modern humans [117], which is the driving
of large game into enclosures or towards cliffs. European
examples date from the Middle Pleistocene onwards, and
some are related to Mousterian lithic assemblages [123, 124].
The latter would not even imply the use of projectiles, since
the animal’s fall would cause their certain death. According to
this author, sophisticated language was needed to coordinate
and organize this kind of hunting technique, though of
course the argument remains indirect.
McBrearty and Brooks [115] also highlight the appear-
ance of fishing and shell-fishing at around 110 and 140 ka,
respectively, in the African record. These activities would
have increased the number of resources available to human
groups, at the same time that they opened marine coastal
regions to exploitation and colonization.
The exodus of anatomically modern humans out of
Africa, whatever its causes, can be traced back to the moment
we see the introduction and systematic use of new resources
into the Middle Stone Age diets. This was clear from the
Lower Stone Age onwards. Once out of Africa, this expansion
led anatomically modern humans to the colonization and
occupation of Eurasian regions that had never before been
explored. From early on this process witnessed the improved
adaptability of relevant populations, who were able to survive
in a broad array of environments and landscapes—on vastly
improved resources. This prevented episodes of food crises
leading to starvation and disease, which would have likely
caused high mortality rates in previous periods.
The geographical expansion in turn brought the appear-
ance of long distance networks, as well as new possibilities
emerging from ties among groups living in different areas
and exploiting different environments. Resources opened for
those populations: not only in terms of alliances created by
marriage—thus broadening the gene pool—but also arriving
from foreign territories, as the case for new raw materials.
More importantly, concepts and ideas, technologies and
beliefs traveled too. Given the richness of what was shared,
developed, and maintained, it seems unlikely that most of
this sharing could have happened without lexical encoding,
therefore presupposing the Faculty of Language [125]. We
turn our attention to this in the next section.
2.3.2. Symbols and Culture. Material remains interpreted
as symbolic, ritualistic, or nonfunctional have often been
the focus of studies trying to shed light on the question of the
origins of language—a highly complex system of symbolic
combination. Some proposals have caused heated debates, as
they revolved around objects of unclear use and significance,
whose putative symbolic nature can only be presumed.
Surely the use of bona-fide symbols implies a particular
cognitive (or even neural) evolution—and perhaps this is
related to some aspects of the Faculty of Language [117].
Howevermaterial culture remains, especially those extremely
rare ones, can only offer a very partial view of the minimum
cognitive abilities of the people who made such objects
[115, 126].
McBrearty and Brooks characterize symbolic behavior
as “the ability to represent objects, people, and abstract
concepts with arbitrary symbols, vocal or visual, and reify
such symbols in cultural practice.” We return shortly to the
issue of whether such an ability entails or is presupposed by
the Faculty of Language. The most commonly undisputed
signs of symbolism in this sense, in the extant archaeological
record, appear in Africa at around 250–300 ka. This is during
the Acheulian-Middle Stone Age boundary, the latter being
a period during which both Homo helmei and early Homo
sapiens were present in Africa [115]. Within the extensive list
of archaeological traits that start appearing at that time, the
following are those classified as symbolic:
(i) regional artifact styles;
(ii) self-adornment objects (ornaments are defined by
Mellars as “small objects for which [there is] no obvi-
ous functional explanation” [127]. Note that Chase
[117] cautions against this direct relationship and
offers an ethnographical list of perforated, grooved
and serrated artefacts with practical functions), like
beads (from c. 82 ka) and other perforated pieces;
(iii) use of pigment—processed (from c. 280 ka onwards);
(iv) notched and incised objects—organic and inorganic
materials (from c. 105 ka);
(v) image and representation—also called “naturalistic
art” (from c. 45 ka in Africa);
(vi) burials with grave goods, ochre, and ritual objects
[128].
A cautionary note is due here. Although McBrearty and
Brooks label the list above “modern human behaviors,” so far
very few anatomically human moderns remains have been
found in association with symbolic artifacts. The same is
true about any components of assemblages to which these
remains are commonly assigned (Middle Stone Age in Africa
and early Upper Paleolithic/Aurignacian in Europe) (physi-
cally, the makers of the early Aurignacian are poorly known
[6], but fossils from Moravia and the Czech Republic link
those to anatomically modern humans rather than to other,
older, populations). Finally, there are cases of Neanderthal
remains associated to Chatelperronian objects—for example,
Saint-Ce´saire, Poitou-Charentes (France) [129, 130], some of
which would qualify as symbolic artifacts according to some
definitions.
8 International Journal of Evolutionary Biology
It is also noteworthy that, in some instances where
allegedly symbolic material has been found in relation
with Neanderthal remains, bona-fide symbolism has been
ruled out as a falsifiable explanation. For instance, while
anatomically modern human burials can certainly be con-
sidered ritualistic, Neanderthal burials are often described
as merely hygienic [131–133]. In a different instance, ochre
was found in the latest Mousterian level and the earliest
Upper Paleolithic level at l’Arbreda Cave in Serinya`, Banyoles
(Spain): to its excavators for the last few decades, this ochre
is a sign of symbolic behavior during the earliest Upper
Paleolithic at the site. However, these researchers do not
understand what the same type of remains mean in the
Mousterian layer below [134]. Thus, curiously, the very same
ochre found in that layer is not related to symbolic activities
[135].
One more interesting debate concerns what happened at
around 40 ka, when the aforementioned modern behaviors
enter the European scene [136]. Then Neanderthals, who for
over 200 ka had developed assemblages entirely devoid of
symbolic artifacts, appear to start producing objects of the
relevant kind. Did Neanderthals suddenly get the Faculty of
Language, or some such symbolic engine? A large number of
researchers have preferred to see this situation as a case of
acculturation of Neanderthals at the hands of innovative and
versatile anatomically modern humans [135].
To sum up, considerable disagreement exists among
experts, and a lot of work still needs to take place before
the fossil evidence yields more information about the
Faculty of Language [117]. But a more serious cautionary
note should be added from the perspective of linguistics,
concerning the validity of taking the vestiges of symbolic
behavior or “symbolic culture” as unquestionable evidence
for the presence of the kinds of complex abilities commonly
associated to the Faculty of Language.
Factually, a collection of cultural practices correlate with
the presence of anatomically modern humans, and a number
of these fall under the rubric of symbolic behavior or culture.
Given this correlation, the following is often assumed as a
valid inference:
(1) Symbolic Culture → the Faculty of Language.
This inference is often supplemented by its converse:
(2) the Faculty of Language → Symbolic Culture.
In essence, this presupposes that a Symbolic Culture is only
possible with language and that a Symbolic Culture is a
necessary consequence of language. Thus,
(3) the Faculty of Language↔ Symbolic Culture.
However, these inferences are invalid, based as they are on
a false premise that the use of linguistic symbols is a special
case of symbolic behavior. We need to clarify this.
We do not question the idea that a Symbolic Culture may
indeed be characterized as an instance of bona-fide symbolic
behavior. This basically means that relevant practices partake
of signification systems established between different entities,
through the relations they stand in with respect to other
entities within the system (the most explicit formulation
of this idea is to be found in Renfrew [137] and Noble
and Davidson [7]. It has never been challenged neither by
evolutionary anthropologists nor by archaeologists). The
problem is that the Faculty of Language does not respond
to this characterization for two different reasons: first, the
Faculty of Language is not a behavior, symbolic or otherwise,
but a natural system of computation. Second, the semantics
of natural languages does not seem to be the product of the
kinds of relations that make cultural symbols meaningful.
As pointed out by Eco [138], cultures can only be
understood as complex and opaque systems of significations.
They are complex because the meaning of each particular
component depends on the relations it establishes with the
other components of the system. They are opaque because
we will hardly be able to know the meaning of a particular
symbol unless we know how it is used (this is, e.g., one of
the arguments for what Renfrew [137] calls the cognitive-
processual approach to archaeology and against what he
calls the interpretive approach). So in order to properly
understand the meaning of a particular element of the
symbolic culture of a group of, say, early humans we should
know how it was used in its context (how its use related
to that of other elements of the same cultural set). It is
highly doubtful that the same general conditions extend to
natural languages, pace Wittgenstein [139] and Ryle [140]
(although Wittgenstein’s work is perhaps the main reference
for Anthropology and Archaeology [141]).
The linguistic point is simple. Once we know the
meaning of given words (DOG, UNICORN, BROWN,
GREEN, etc.) we automatically gain access to themeanings of
combinations thereof (BROWNDOG, BROWNUNICORN,
GREEN DOG, etc.). This is so even without previous
familiarity with the situations in which these symbols might
be appropriate. In short, the semantics of natural languages
possesses two well-established properties that no cultural
system of symbols exhibits: compositionality and productivity.
The only known explanation for these linguistic conditions
is through the action of a computational system capable of
dealing with hierarchical structures.
The contrast is thus clear. While the meanings of the
elements making up a Symbolic Culture are opaque until we
enter in contact with that Symbolic Culture (to participate
in/observe/be informed of the practices in which these
elements become meaningful), nothing of this sort applies
to the meanings of linguistic complex expressions. These
we naturally grasp as we hear them, even with no prior
exposition and in the absence of corresponding entities or
situations. Nothing of this comes as a surprise once we
accept that Symbolic Culture and the Faculty of Language
are very disparate entities: Symbolic Cultures are systems of
complex and intricate culturally acquired behaviors, while
the Faculty of Language is a natural component of the
mind/brain of certain organisms (for detailed presentations
of this argument see Fodor [30, 142–144]. Wittgenstein was
aware of the consequences of the argument and, therefore,
tried to show that the semantics of utterances is in fact
not compositional [145]. Such a view has not been very
influential in semantic studies [30, 146, 147]).
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From all this it follows that “meaning” in a cultural sys-
tem of symbols (or “meaningSC”) is probably quite different
from “meaning” in a natural language (or “meaningFL”). A
crucial consequence of this is that the capacity of dealing
with meaningSC does not presuppose or entail the capacity
of dealing with meaningFL. The putative connection between
the two in humans is a contingent fact on which we cannot
base reliable generalizations. The logic is corroborated by
the fact that nonhuman apes appear to be able to acquire
symbolic systems, at least under experimental conditions
[148]—and perhaps even in the wild [149]. No primate,
however, has ever been able to acquire/develop a full-fledged
“language,” or even rudimentary versions thereof involving
some serious combinatorial syntax.
3. A Biolinguistic View on
the Neanderthal/ModernDivide
3.1. Linguistic Complexity. Once again, the Faculty of Lan-
guage is a natural computational system, capable of con-
structing complex expressions with a hierarchical structure
and nuanced dependencies holding at arbitrarily long dis-
tances. The hierarchical structure of linguistic expressions is
illustrated by the simple fact that the sentence “The boy says
that he likes apples” contains the sentence “He likes apples”,
and could be contained within the sentence “Everybody
knows that [. . .].” This means that linguistic utterances are
not mere concatenations or linear arrangements of symbols
but are instead hierarchically organized sets of units, as the
following bracketing representation shows:
(4) [Everybody knows [that the boy says [that he likes
apples]]].
As for long-distance dependencies, note for example that (4)
contains a subject pronoun (he) optionally coreferring with
the subject noun phrase (the boy) in the middle sentence.
This preferred (though not obligatory) reading is captured
by coindexation:
(5) [Everybody knows [that the boyi says [that hei likes
apples]]].
Further dependences exist in this sentence under the form
of subject/verb agreement (“everybody knows”, “the boy
says,” and “he likes”). Arbitrarily large amounts of linguistic
material can be introduced in between the verb and its
subjects, without this having effect in the robustness of the
dependency. Thus observe that
(6) Everybody in this (large (but still very (very. . .)
charming . . .)) house knows that the boy with the red
hat (that was a present form good old Santa . . .) says
that he uncontrollably (and in fact evenmorbidly . . .)
likes apples.
In addition, linguistic expressions can contain more sub-
tle forms of long-distance dependences, technically known
as “displacement” relations. This point can be illustrated
with Wh-interrogative sentences, in which question words
show up far away from the position where they receive
interpretation as verbal arguments, as in (7) (where “e”
represents the “empty position” left behind by question word
after “moving”):
(7) [Whati does everybody know [that the boy says [that
he likes ei]].
The ones just reviewed are well-established linguistic facts
[28, 150]. They are, in a nutshell, the reasons behind the
characterization of the Faculty of Language as a “Type 1”
system in terms of its computational complexity, using as a
reference point the Chomsky Hierarchy of formal grammar
[40–43], which we review next.
3.2. Formal Complexity. The said hierarchy defines different
classes of “formal languages” (or corresponding grammars),
arranged in an increasing scale of complexity. In these
mathematical constructs, a “formal language” is understood
as a set of strings of symbols generated under certain general
admissibility conditions. Crucially, for a system of these
characteristics to work, a finite collection of rules, describing
the admissible strings in the language, can be produced
and result in a computation that halts at some point (it
should be easy to see, given the characterization of a “formal
language” just introduced, that this mathematical notion
is not synonymous to the biolinguistic notion of language
defined at the outset of this paper. The notions are however
related in some abstract sense [151]).
This ensures that, given the rules of a language (tech-
nically, its grammar), some computational device exists
capable of mechanically generating any of the strings of the
language in question. However, since the arrangement of
symbols in a string may be more or less intricate, in definable
ways, some languages may require more or less complex
devices to generate them. The complexity of a language-
generating device (an automaton) is essentially defined in
terms of the amount and sophistication of its memory
resources. Simply put, more complex languages can only
be generated by automata with the appropriate memory
resources. This distinction is what underlies the traditional
classification of languages, grammars, and corresponding
automata from Type 3 (or “finite-state”, the simplest ones)
to Type 0, the most complex.
The Chomsky Hierarchy therefore provides a useful
frame of reference to determine the complexity of Turing-
computable problems (the architecture of relevant automata
was defined by Alan Turing by theoretically imagining a
logical processor writing operational steps on an infinite
tape, one step at a time. When one speaks of “memory”
within this system, one is basically referring to the ability
to designate sections of the writing tape not so much for
the purposes of carrying the computation forward but rather
with the purpose of storing instructions to be used at later
computational times. Different memory regimes determine,
in the end, the overall complexity of the “formal languages”
so characterized). Any such problem, inasmuch as it is
computationally tractable, may be expressed by way of a
“formal language” in the Hierarchy—success in this task
being just a matter of identifying the critical properties of
the problem. Type 3 languages are so simple that they can be
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described by an automaton with no memory (strings in this
type of language are in fact like beads arranged in a linear
fashion, with no further internal structuring).
Next up in the hierarchy, we find Type 2 or context-
free languages. These need an automaton with enough
memory to keep track of what structure is being built, while
some embedded substructure is being further constructed.
Context-free languages already provide a good measure
of complexity for natural languages, since most of their
structures fall within the computational capabilities of a
“push-down” automaton. This is so called because it contains
a simple memory “stack,” such that the last item stored into
the “stack” is the first one to come out, the top of said “stack”
always being involved when recalling items from memory.
Push-down automata may actually describe some long-
distance dependencies: those that happen to be “nested”
within one another, as in the English example in (8a) (part
of the sentence “Peter says that John wants to let Mary
read the book”).However, natural language dependencies are
known to also be “crossed-serial.” One relevant example is
the translation of (8a) into a language like Dutch:
(8a)
That John wants to let Mary to read the book
(8b)
dat Jan Marie het book wil laten lezen
Push-down automata are not equipped to deal with the
sorts of dependencies in (8b). This is so because no simple
“stack” regime can allow the computation to, at the same
time, establish a dependency between two items in the
computation and to continue holding an item in between
those two in active memory—for subsequent computation.
“Stacks” are too simple minded a memory: the entire set
of stored items has to be active up to the very last item in
storage, and this last item must be the first to be recalled.
A more powerful kind of automaton is needed to
generate cross-serial dependencies, either with allowable
manipulations within the “stack” (not just at the top) or a
different sort of memory procedure. It is this property of
natural languages that makes them characterizable as Type
1, or context-sensitive, within the scale of computational
complexity defined by the Chomsky Hierarchy (see Table 1
for a summary). Indeed, most theoretical discussion in the
last half century has ultimately centered around the issue of
precisely how (and when) linguistic structures happen to be
of this complex sort.
Table 1: The first three levels of complexity of the Chomsky
Hierarchy, with a formal example of the kinds of structures each
generates. A context-free grammar may keep track of the number
of symbols in every subset so long as it deals with a maximum
of two correlated subsets, If the same number of symbols in three
(or more) correlated subsets is required within a given “formal
language”, a context-sensitive grammar is required to describe it
[152].
Level of complexity Language Sample string
Type 3, finite-state a∗b∗c∗ aabbbbccc
Type 2, context-free anbnc∗ aaabbbcc
Type 1, context-sensitive anbncn aaabbbccc
3.3. Is the Complexity of Knots Relevant to
the Archaeology of Language?
From our evolutionary perspective, an interesting question
arises in light of the formal facts just reviewed. One way to
determine whether a given hominid species had the Faculty
of Language (as presently exhibited by us) would be to test
their computational capabilities—in order to determine how
high they were within the Chomsky Hierarchy. Obviously
this is not doable in any direct fashion, since the fossil
record does not contain direct linguistic evidence of the right
sort. Nevertheless, there may well be an indirect manner to
proceed that could take advantage of fossilized remains, by
seeking traces of language in domains that, while not being
directly defined as linguistic, may presuppose a “technical
intelligence” that could well be, in some sense at least,
parasitic on the Faculty of Language [153]. The prospect is
realistic inasmuch as, as emphasized at the outset, this faculty
interfaces with other cognitive systems and, through these,
with general cognition and the mechanisms underlying
behavior [33, 154].
From this perspective the key is to observe relevant
aspects of the fossil record with a “grammatical lens,”
thus asking what sort of algorithm would computationally
describe a given rule-governed behavior. If such an algorithm
happens to be low within the Chomsky Hierarchy, not
much can be surmised from the exercise, since behaviors
thus described are common in animal cognition. But if the
opposite is the case, and a hypothesized algorithm to describe
a given behavior happens to fall high within the Chomsky
Hierarchy, the result would potentially be significant. This
is so because it is very rare to find bona-fide complex
computational behaviors in the natural world. When or if
such behaviors are isolated and properly described, three
possibilities emerge for them: (i) that they correspond to a
mental capacity that is totally unrelated to the Faculty of
Language, (ii) that they depend, instead, on some interface
with the computational procedure that the Faculty of
Language presupposes, or (iii) that the said behaviors obey
the conditions of a faculty that actually underlies both the
Faculty of Language and whatever is responsible for the
inferred behavior.
The idea of connecting artifactual properties with the
presence of language (in some sense) is not new. But such
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exercises are rarely accompanied by rigorous criteria for
evaluating the validity of underlying correspondences [155].
The foregoing discussion is aimed at addressing this method-
ological concern. A proposal originally made by Uriagereka
et al. [156, 157], concerning the capacity to tie knots, is a
model story of what we are arguing for. It involves a unique
behavior within apes, whose computational description falls
high within the Chomsky Hierarchy and whose results are
inferable from the fossil record.
Particular knotting techniques (say, “clove hitch,”
“Eskimo bowline,” and so on) are cultural practices. What
interests us, instead, is the fact that, underlying these
technical traditions, a certain natural capacity exists that,
so it seems, is not accessible to other primates. One way
to assess the complexity of knot tying is to resort to their
mathematical characteristics. Knot-theory is the branch of
topology that deals with the nature and properties of knots.
From this perspective knots are conceptualized as elastic,
closed, and tangled strings. Themost basic knot (the unknot)
is like a circle (i.e., a string joined by its two ends) lying
on a single plane. More complex knots are constructed by
crossings of the string, such that some parts thereof lie on
more than one plane. The minimal knot is a string with
three crossings (the so-called threefoil knot). An important
area of knot-theory is to determine whether a complexly
tangled string is the unknot, and if not what kind of knot
it is (the “unkotting problem”). Formal details aside, the
task of determining whether any given string is knotted is
known to have a complexity comparable to the one needed
to process an expression in a natural language (for given
knots the computational complexity can be greater than that
needed to process linguistic expressions, which moves us
into obscure issues dealing with mathematical intuition in
humans. Still, for our point to be relevant it is enough to
think of simple knottings of the sort routinely used at work
in human societies. For an introduction to knot-theory see
[158], and [159] for complexity issues).
When actually making a knot, humans must, at a
certain point in time, relate a portion in the knot with
the background “figure”. Intuitively, this is an operation
in which both grouping and long distance-like relations
are implied [156, 157, 160]. If so (un)tying knots (or
determining whether a tangled string is knotted) seems to
require an underlying computational system of Type 1 (or
even a more powerful system). Once again, such a system is
context-sensitive, which is to say capable of keeping track of
the computational history until the overlapping(s) needed
for knotting take(s) place. The process as a whole can be
modeled by storing some (arbitrary) elements A, B, C, in that
order, in some computational stack, to then proceed to relate
element A at the bottomof the stack to some element D in the
current state of the computation (the crossing). This could be
represented as in (9a), which is to be compared to (9b):
(9a) [D1 [C [B A1]]]
(9b) [Whati does everybody know [that the boy says [that
he likes ei]].
Abstracting away semantically irrelevant symbols, the formal
parallel with a long-distance dependency should be clear.
Again, the correspondence itself could signal the exis-
tence of a grammar for knots. However, these sorts of
dependencies are exceedingly rare within the primate world.
It seems more plausible to ascribe the parallelism in (9)
either to the bona-fide Faculty of Language (extended in
the appropriate cognitive direction [161]) or to a deeper
cognitive system underlying both that faculty and some
putative system specific to knots. If either of the latter
conditions holds, finding structures of the sort in (9a) in the
fossil record would argue for the Faculty of Language being
in place by that time.
One last important clarification is in order: being able to
learn a specific motor sequence to tie a knot is not sufficient
evidence for inferring complex cognitive capacities. The
scarce literature on knot-tying abilities in humans has only
focused on how people learn to tie a knot either by instruc-
tion or by imitation [162, 163]. This may tell us something
about how a cultural practice may have been transmitted,
but it says nothing about the process of inventing new
knots, which humans have been doing for millennia. Similar
confusions often arise in the literature on animal behavior,
for example when attempting to demonstrate whether birds
can parse nested dependencies [164]. As has been noted
by many [165, 166], training a bird to successfully identify
a couple of such dependencies may tell us nothing about
the ability involved in creating any new such expression.
Full creativity has always been what is most puzzling about
human language.
3.4. Setting the Record Straight. Knots are not directly
attested in Anatomically Modern Humans until 27 ka B.P.,
by means of weaving, both in clothing and clothing repre-
sentations [167]. However, they can be inferred long before
that, from purposefully perforated ornaments (beads, teeth,
shells, etc.) and small projectile technology (arrow heads,
arches, and harpoons), the oldest evidence of which is about
90–75 ka ([168–170], and [171] for an even earlier date).
Those dates, of course, are tantalizingly close to what is
presumed to be in the range of the emergence of the Faculty
of Language.
From this perspective, a very intriguing issue is whether
Neanderthals (or, for that matter, other hominids) were
capable of knotting behaviors. Perforated shells dated at
50 ka and older, found at the Aviones site, Spain, have been
presented as an indication that Neanderthals shared some
of these practices with Anatomically Modern Humans [13].
The case merits serious examination, but the fact that the
perforations in point are not deliberate (that is, they are
indisputably due to natural causes) makes one wonder to
what extent the relevant ornament was used in a deliberate
way as a carefully crafted and prominently worn piece of
jewelry, possibly a mark of social status.
Possibilities to interpret the relevant data, even from a
biolinguistic point of view, are multiple. However, the most
promising seem to be two. The first is that the Faculty of
Language is an anatomically modern human evolutionary
novelty among primates. By and large, this possibility
fits well with the strong contrast between the material
culture of anatomically modern humans and Neanderthals
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[4, 6, 12, 128, 172–176]. The extremely diversified and
dynamic character of the former could be a reflection of
the open-endedness productivity of the Faculty of Language,
a consequence of its computational properties [177]. Note
that a computational system of Type 2 is enough for genuine
“recursion” (or systematic and unlimited nested embedding)
[33, 178]. This is the formal property that explains why
sentences have no upper limit of components and, therefore,
that there is no upper number of possible utterances a
language allows [179]. However, recursion is still insufficient
to deal with the real complexity of human languages. The
qualification is in order because it could even be the case that
Neanderthals had achieved one level of complexity without
reaching the other see [180–183] for perspective. The second
hypothesis is that the Faculty of Language is a feature shared
by both anatomically modern humans and Neanderthals,
already present in their common ancestor (i.e., a sapiens
synapomorphy).
The latter position would rationalize Krause et al.’s
finding concerning the antiquity of the FOXP2 genetic
variant [8]. It also would explain the abilities underlying
the ornaments of Aviones site (see above; [13]) particularly
if some independent proof is found of their use as beads
tied together by some sort of thread. This hypothesis would
be consistent with the possibility that there might exist
other Type 1 computational systems in nature—beyond the
human Faculty of Language. One case to examine seriously
involves species of weaver birds that tie knots as a part of
their nest construction techniques. Some of these knots are
(near) equivalents of human knots [184, 185] (some apes
in captivity have been reported to tie simple knots [186]).
The jury is of course out on whether this means that the
birds in point have the cognitive equivalent of a Faculty of
Language, albeit with nest-building consequences instead of
anything familiar to humans. Key to answering that question
would be to determine the level of complexity the birds
can attain in their knot-tying abilities. Patently, some of
their relevant knots are more complex than others, and the
question is whether any or all of them can be produced by
the compilation of a motor skill (for example, the knots
used in Michel and Harkins’ experiment [162] are simple
(the sheepshank, the butterfly knot, and the “magic” slip-
knot), and yet only 37% of their subjects were able to learn
to tie the three of them by just attending demonstrations, i.e.,
observing the necessary motor sequence to tie them).
Clarifying either position should also help us understand
the late cultural achievements of Neanderthals: whether
they constitute an acculturation effect from contacts with
anatomically modern humans [12, 187], an independent cul-
tural development [11, 130], an intraspecific “last minute”
evolutionary event, or even the result of interbreeding [49].
It is good to have new tools to address such open questions.
4. Conclusions
In presenting the biolinguistic approach to the study of
language, this paper has developed some ideas on how that
approach may contribute to the study of human history. For
the brand of linguistics we represent, the communicative
or even symbolic aspects of language are not as central as
its formal properties. Only by focusing on these properties
are we able to draw a clear picture of the computational
resources necessary to generate a human language. The
natural cognitive computational system capable of deploying
these resources—the Faculty of Language, an organ of
our minds/brains—is thus our main subject of inquiry.
Given this basic assumption, we have explored how research
on Evolutionary Anthropology can be complemented: by
qualifying or reassessing the interpretation of the existing
data. It is our hope that future research will benefit
from the perspective offered here, by strengthening the
interdisciplinary stance that the inquiry into the origins
of our species necessarily requires. When we need to date
remains, we turn to Physics and Chemistry; when studying
hominid remains, we ask palaeobiologists and geneticists—
and experts on nutrition are consulted when palaeodiets are
the focus. Similarly, when aiming at progress in the study of
language and its origins, linguistics should prove to be useful.
We hope it has been.
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